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Article 
 
When Structure Fails:  
Justice Kennedy, Liberty, and Trump v. Hawaii 
FRANK J. COLUCCI† 
This symposium Article situates Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s final concurring opinion in Trump v. 
Hawaii within his larger jurisprudence. Part I traces its separation of powers foundations by 
examining then-Judge Kennedy’s Ninth Circuit opinions in Chadha v. INS and Beller v. Middendorf. 
While in Chadha Kennedy shows sensitivity to how congressional action can threaten personal liberty, 
in Beller he expresses substantial deference to executive decisions about military necessity and foreign 
policy at the expense of personal liberties. Part II reviews several early Supreme Court opinions, 
where Kennedy articulates a judicial duty to police separation of powers as essential to liberty, yet 
expresses willingness to protect presidential power from both direct and indirect threats from 
Congress and the courts. Part III reexamines Kennedy’s opinions in enemy combatant cases after 
2001, culminating in Boumediene v. Bush. These opinions, often read as a rebuke of executive power, 
in fact express his primary concern with both preserving personal liberty and preventing 
congressional abdication of its powers. Part IV surveys later Kennedy opinions leading to Trump that 
uphold exclusive executive power—especially in areas of immigration and foreign affairs—from the 
burdens of legislative and judicial intrusion even at the cost to individual liberty. Part V focuses on 
Kennedy’s final opinion in Trump, where he characteristically votes to protect presidential power and 
ensure that neither Congress nor courts should “intrude on the foreign affairs power of the 
Executive.”1 
This Article’s conclusion explores the tension Kennedy explicitly recognizes in Trump between two 
main strands of his jurisprudence: protection of presidential prerogative in foreign affairs and the 
judicial obligation to define and enforce personal liberty. His “further observation” in Trump, 
recognizes how liberty relies ultimately on politicians exercising statesmanship and public confidence 
that they act with fidelity to larger constitutional values. Despite promises expressed in his earlier 
opinions, Kennedy in Trump finally concedes that neither constitutional structure nor courts enforcing 
law are sufficient to secure liberty.   
 
 † Associate Professor of Political Science, Purdue University Northwest. I'd like to thank the HLJ staff—
especially Nina Gliozzo and Alyxandra Vernon—for their fine editorial work. Errors of course remain my own. 
This Article was profoundly influenced by the example of my advisor Donald P. Kommers, who spent 
his life teaching and writing about the importance of constitutionalism and the limits of law. 
 1. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s final concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii2 
shaped both initial reactions to his retirement from the U.S. Supreme Court and 
first assessments of his legacy. Commentators called his vote to join the Trump 
majority, which allowed President Trump’s order banning entry by nationals of 
several countries to take effect, a “betrayal,”3 a “surrender,”4 and a “coup.”5 
Others categorized Kennedy’s last opinion as “depressing defeatism,”6 “at odds” 
with the “animating principles” of his larger approach to law.7 Still others read 
it as an “empty gesture” and “an expression of defeat and a loss of integrity . . . at 
precisely the moment that it was most needed”8 or “an elusive conclusion for the 
career of an elusive justice.”9 
 
 2. Id. (overturning lower court preliminary injunction suspending enforcement of Proclamation No. 9645, 
82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017)).  
 3. Noah Feldman, Opinion, Justice Kennedy’s Legacy Is the Dignity He Bestowed, BLOOMBERG NEWS 
(June 27, 2018, 12:24 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-27/anthony-kennedy-
retirement-his-legacy-is-dignity-he-created. 
 4. Christian Farias, Justice Kennedy Surrendered to Donald Trump, N.Y. MAG. (June 27, 2018), 
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/06/justice-kennedy-surrendered-to-donald-trump.html. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Richard L. Hasen, Did Anthony Kennedy Just Signal His Retirement? (Update: Yes.), SLATE (June 26, 
2018, 1:38 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/did-justice-anthony-kennedy-just-signal-his-
retirement.html.  
 7. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, An Immigration Legacy at Odds with Justice Kennedy’s Animating 
Principles, SCOTUSBLOG (July 3, 2018, 7:29 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/an-immigration-
legacy-at-odds-with-justice-kennedys-animating-principles/. 
 8. Leslie Kendrick & Micah Swartzmann, Comment, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 
169 (2018) (footnote omitted). 
 9. Josh Blackmun, The Travel Bans, 2017–2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29, 47. 
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Kennedy’s own words in Trump contribute to this confusion. He begins by 
admitting “the substantial deference that is and must be accorded to the 
Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs.”10 His final paragraphs, however, 
speak to the “urgent necessity that officials adhere to these constitutional 
guarantees.”11 “An anxious world,” he concludes, requires reassurance “that our 
Government remains committed always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to 
preserve and protect, so that freedom extends outward, and lasts.”12  
Read in light of his previous opinions in separation of powers cases, 
Kennedy’s ambiguity in Trump merits deeper exploration. Kennedy’s record in 
separation of powers cases is not merely “pragmatic” and “centrist.”13 Even 
before coming to the U.S. Supreme Court, Kennedy exercised judicial power to 
enforce his belief that constitutional structure is essential to preserving 
individual liberty.14 On the Court, he vigorously enforced separation of powers, 
including limits on executive power in cases like Clinton v. City of New York15 
and Boumediene v. Bush.16 His judicial commitment to enforcing the full and 
necessary meaning of liberty requires that courts not leave structural issues 
solely to political resolution, but vigilantly enforce written and functional limits 
on the powers of each branch. “When structure fails,” Kennedy wrote, “liberty 
is always in peril.”17 For the bulk of his career, Kennedy found failures of 
constitutional structure arose more often from congressional abdication or 
judicial intrusion than from executive overreach. His Trump opinion suggests a 
final reconsideration of this presumption. 
This Article situates Justice Kennedy’s final concurrence in Trump v. 
Hawaii within his larger jurisprudence. Part I traces the foundations by 
examining his Ninth Circuit opinions in Chadha v. INS and Beller v. 
Middendorf. Even in these early cases, then-Judge Kennedy’s enforcement of 
separation of powers is primarily concerned with threats to executive power 
from Congress. While in Chadha Kennedy is sensitive to how legislative actions 
can threaten personal liberty,18 in Beller he expresses substantial deference to 
executive decisions about military necessity and foreign policy, even at the cost 
of personal liberties protected under the Constitution.19 Part II reviews several 
 
 10. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Contra Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy on 
Separation of Powers and Federalism, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 531, 582 (2014). 
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. 524 U.S. 417, 450, 452–53 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (writing separately to discuss separation 
of powers and noting even if separation of powers proves insufficient this “cannot validate an otherwise 
unconstitutional device”).  
 16. 553 U.S. 723, 764–66 (2008) (majority opinion by Kennedy, J.) (“The Government’s formal 
sovereignty-based test raises troubling separation-of-powers concerns as well.”). 
 17. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 18. 634 F.2d 408, 422 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 19. 632 F.2d 788, 810–11 (9th Cir. 1980). 
70.5-COLUCCI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2019  9:45 AM 
1144 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1141 
 
opinions from early in Justice Kennedy’s tenure on the Court, which describe 
his judicial duty to police separation of powers as essential to liberty while acting 
to protect executive power from both direct and indirect threats from Congress 
and courts. Part III surveys Justice Kennedy’s opinions in enemy combatant 
cases after 2001, culminating in Boumediene. These opinions, often read as 
rebukes of executive power, in fact express his primary concern with both liberty 
and preventing congressional abdication of its power to suspend habeas corpus.  
Part IV surveys several later Justice Kennedy opinions leading up to Trump 
which uphold exclusive executive power—especially in areas of immigration 
and foreign affairs—from the burdens of legislative and judicial intrusion. 
Justice Kennedy sustains executive power even when conceding the cost to 
individual liberty. Part V focuses on Justice Kennedy’s final opinion in Trump, 
assessing its consistencies with, and departures from, his larger approach to 
separation of powers. In Trump, he characteristically votes to protect presidential 
power and to ensure that neither Congress nor courts should “intrude on the 
foreign affairs power of the Executive,” but adds a “further observation” which 
recognizes consequences for the preservation of liberty in the Court’s ruling.20  
This Article concludes by exploring the tension Kennedy recognizes in 
Trump between two main strands of his broader jurisprudence: protection of 
presidential power in foreign affairs and the judicial obligation to protect 
personal liberty. It then reconsiders the consequences of his “further 
observation” that true security for liberty relies ultimately on politicians 
exercising statesmanship and public confidence in their fidelity to constitutional 
values.21 Despite promises inherent and explicit in his earlier opinions, in Trump, 
Justice Kennedy finally admits that neither constitutional structure nor courts 
suffice to guarantee liberty.22  
I.  JUDGE KENNEDY AND SEPARATION OF POWERS ON THE NINTH CIRCUIT: 
CHADHA AND BELLER 
Kennedy’s commitments to judicial enforcement of separation of powers 
and to preserving executive prerogatives date from his two major Ninth Circuit 
opinions concerning constitutional structure: Chadha v. INS23 and Beller v. 
Middendorf.24 His opinions in Chadha—later affirmed on different grounds by 
the Supreme Court—and Beller offer previews to how he would eventually 
approach separation of powers issues on the Court, and provide some premises 
underlying his last Trump v. Hawaii opinion. In these Ninth Circuit opinions, 
then-Judge Kennedy eschews textualism and originalism for a more functional 
 
 20. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. 634 F.2d. 408, aff’d on other grounds, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 24. 632 F.2d. 788, cert. denied sub nom., Beller v. Lehman, 452 U.S. 905 (1981), overruled by Witt v. 
Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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analysis sensitive to threats to the effective exercise of executive power.25 These 
opinions arise from an overriding concern with congressional attempts both to 
assume the powers of other branches—especially the executive—and to abdicate 
its own authority. At the same time, Kennedy articulated his willingness to defer 
to executive power in military and foreign affairs, even in a case where a plaintiff 
raises a strong claim based on constitutional liberty.26 
Kennedy’s Ninth Circuit opinion in Chadha invalidated the one-house 
legislative veto traditionally used to overturn orders preventing deportation as 
provided under the Immigration and Nationality Act.27 While his ruling was 
affirmed and broadened by the Supreme Court,28 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for 
the Ninth Circuit was based not on original history or the text of the presentment 
clause (as was Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court), but on a broader 
functional analysis of separation of powers and the proper role of judiciary.29  
Kennedy explicitly rejects claims—such as those presented in Justice 
White’s Supreme Court dissent—that the distribution of power among branches 
is a “history of accommodation and practicality” and “a necessary check on the 
unavoidably expanding power of the agencies, both Executive and independent, 
as they engage in exercising authority delegated by Congress.”30 “It would stand 
the political question doctrine on its head,” Justice Kennedy writes, “to require 
the Judiciary to defer to another branch’s determination that its acts do not 
violate the separation of powers principle.”31 As Justice Kennedy elaborates, “it 
is the Judiciary’s prerogative . . . to adjudicate a claimed excess by a coordinate 
branch of its constitutional powers.”32 
Kennedy concludes the legislative veto, as exercised in this particular case, 
“violates the constitutional doctrine of separation because it is a prohibited 
legislative intrusion upon the Executive and Judicial branches” that is “usurping 
a necessary power of another branch.”33 To conduct this analysis, he writes, “we 
must examine the purpose and function of the constitutional doctrine, 
particularly as it pertains to the boundaries of legislative authority.”34  
 
 25. See infra note 69. 
 26. See Beller, 632 F.2d at 810–11. 
 27. Chadha, 634 F.2d. at 411, 420 (holding that the statutory provision for one-house veto violates the 
doctrine of separation of powers). 
 28. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983). 
 29. See Chadha, 634 F.2d at 420–21. In a 1984 speech explaining his process and reasoning while deciding 
Chadha, Kennedy said, “I had mentioned the presentment clause, but struck it from the last draft as superfluous 
to our holding.” Anthony M. Kennedy, Judge, Ninth Cir., Hoover Lecture at Stanford Law School 1 (May 17, 
1984) (on file with Journal) [hereinafter Kennedy, Hoover Lecture]. 
 30. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 999, 1002 (White, J., dissenting). 
 31. Chada, 634 F.2d at 419. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 420–421.  
 34. Id. at 421.  
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For Kennedy, separation of powers “is neither doctrinaire nor rigid” but “a 
cautious balance of antimonies.”35 It “is at once pervasive and fluid” and “there 
will be instances where the proper means for its enforcement rest with the mutual 
respect that each branch of the Government must extend to the others.”36 Yet, 
when “transgressions are more patent. . . . it is the duty of the Judicial Branch to 
resolve disputes with or among the other component parts of the Government.”37 
In Chadha’s case, “a private litigant is, in part, a surrogate for a branch whose 
powers have been usurped” and who “asserts a separate and personal legal 
interest, namely, that the exercise of government power exceeds constitutional 
bounds and is therefore an unlawful invasion of individual rights.”38 
Kennedy finds two purposes in enforcement of separation of powers. The 
first is “to prevent an unnecessary and therefore dangerous concentration of 
power in one branch.”39 Justice Kennedy fears “the natural tendency of each 
center of power to compete to enlarge or maintain its own influence.”40 He thus 
seeks “to deter any one branch from attaining hegemony,” as “[a]n undue 
concentration of authority in one branch inevitably causes structural 
decomposition of the other branches, along with a dispersal of their original 
powers.”41 
Kennedy notes that a second purpose of separation of powers is “a practical 
measure to facilitate administration of large nation by the assignment of 
numerous labors to designated authorities.”42 Unlike Justice White, he concludes 
that constitutional limits to delegations apply to this legislative veto.43 “Just as 
the separation of powers prohibits the accumulation of too much power in one 
branch, the nondelegation doctrine prevents one branch from abrogating its 
authority in a wholesale and standardless manner.”44 
From these two principles, Kennedy defines a 
constitutional violation of the separation of powers as an assumption by one 
branch of powers that are central or essential to the operation of a coordinate 
branch, provided also that the assumption disrupts the coordinate branch in the 
performance of its duties and is unnecessary to implement a legitimate policy of 
the Government.45  
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 421–422.  
 37. Id. at 422. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 422–423.  
 41. Id. at 423.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 423–24.  
 44. Id. at 424. 
 45. Id. at 425. 
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He goes further: “[i]f an exercise of functions which lie at the center of another 
branch is attempted on a long-term and routine basis, a violation of the 
constitutional rule requiring separation of powers is more easily established.”46 
Kennedy conducts an extensive analysis of the one-house veto and finds “a 
constitutional violation” and usurpation of both executive and judicial power.47 
First, he finds the one-house veto “an interference with a central function of the 
Judiciary, . . . [one] both disruptive and unnecessary.”48 Courts review “whether 
the Executive branch has corrected applied the statute that establishes its 
authority.”49 The ability of Congress to overturn such a decision “implies a 
radical alteration of the role of federal courts in the field of administrative law,” 
making judicial rulings, “in effect, impermissible advisory opinions.”50 With the 
threat of this veto, “the Legislative branch has disrupted or severed the 
Judiciary’s relation to the alien in a substantial way” and “potential nullification 
of judicial attempts to require uniform application of the statute by the 
Executive.”51 This legislative veto “diminishes the strength of the Judiciary’s 
structural check on the Executive, which is one of the twin purposes behind the 
separation of powers principle.”52  
Kennedy emphasizes the subordination of judiciary to the legislature under 
the one-house veto, “thus undermining the integrity of the third branch.”53 In his 
view, by doing this, Congress “disrupts the judicial system by retaining a 
selective power to override individual adjudications, in lieu of changing 
standards prospectively by the usual, corrective device of a statutory 
amendment.”54 He finds “virtually no procedural constraints on the ultimate 
congressional decision.”55  
Justice Kennedy also finds the very existence of the legislative veto 
disruptive to the executive and the judiciary. He criticizes “legislative 
interference, constant in its potentiality, can be exercised in any given case 
without a change in the general standards the legislature has initially decreed.”56 
The possibility of “[s]ummary reversal” of “an action that carried all of the 
weight and dignity that necessarily attends deliberative decisions by one of the 
highest officers in the Executive branch” by one house of Congress “detracts 
from the authority of the second branch, and to that extent undermines its 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 429.  
 48. Id. at 430. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 431. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 432. 
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powers.”57 He finds this interference “with a relation between the second branch 
and the persons governed by its decisions” to be “egregious.”58 
Even while, “Congress holds all legislative powers”59 and “[t]he statute 
was enacted for the most humanitarian of considerations,”60 Kennedy writes:  
We cannot accept that definite, uniform, and sensible criteria . . . should be 
replaced by a species of nonlegislation, wherein the Executive branch becomes a 
sort of referee in making an initial determination which has no independent force 
or validity, even after review by the Judiciary, save and except for the exercise 
of final control by the unfettered discretion of Congress as to each case.61  
For Justice Kennedy, “[s]uch flexibility is but the structural twin of lawless 
rule.”62 
In a 1984 lecture delivered after the Supreme Court’s decision in Chadha, 
Kennedy admitted his differences from Chief Justice Burger’s majority decision 
based solely on the presentment clause.63 He conceded that the “more sweeping 
approach” adopted by the Supreme Court “emphasized the specific language of 
the Constitution.”64 While “[p]art of my approach was that of an interpretivist 
with a focus on the intent of the framers . . . . In reviewing the opinion, it does 
not seem to me to be entirely successful in this regard.”65 
For Kennedy, the challenge was neither textual nor historical, but practical. 
“[T]he ultimate question Chadha poses is how to bring a sense of order and 
responsibility to the shambles that is now the congressional process.”66 He 
questioned the consequences of Justice Burger’s broader ruling. “If you strike 
down the legislative veto, you trim the powers of the legislative branch, but you 
may be doing it at the expense of allowing a sprawling federal bureaucracy to 
go uncontrolled.”67 Yet he also noted, “[i]f we say that agencies constitute a 
fourth branch of the government, and it is necessary to control them, is it not a 
problem of modern political science to design the remedy, rather than to rely on 
interpretation of the writings of 1788?”68 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit “tried to 
follow a functionalist analysis in the balance of the opinion and thus relied on 
something more than history.”69 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 435.  
 60. Id. at 436. 
 61. Id. at 435–36. 
 62. Id. at 436. 
 63. Kennedy, Hoover Lecture, supra note 29, at 1. 
 64. Id. at 4. Kennedy also spoke in August 1987 at a Ninth Circuit judicial conference panel titled “A 
Bicentennial Review of Separation of Powers: What Is the Role of Courts in Constitutional Interpretation?” 
While on a panel along with fellow federal judges William A. Norris and Frank Easterbrook, as well as Stanford 
Law School Dean Paul Brest, Kennedy made no specific comments about his decision in Chadha. 
 65. Id. at 4. 
 66. Id. at 2. 
 67. Id. at 4. 
 68. Id. at 4.  
 69. Id. at 5.  
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Kennedy’s functionalism focuses on the propensity of Congress to disrupt 
the executive and legislative branches. He noted in his speech “we might have 
been somewhat harsh to Congress” in the Chadha opinion.70 But he was no less 
harsh to Congress later in the 1984 address: “The ultimate question then is 
whether the Chadha decision will be the catalyst for some basic congressional 
changes.”71 He admitted “[m]y view of this is not a sanguine one”72 and reflected 
that he was “not sure what it will take for Congress to confront its own lack of 
self-discipline, its own lack of a principled course of action besides the ethic of 
securing its reelection.”73 Kennedy’s criticism extends beyond those he 
attributes to the Framers: “Madison distrusted Congress because it would 
aggrandize the other branches; but I think the more real concern is its 
competence within its own legitimate sphere.”74  
Kennedy expressed such criticism of Congress in other off-the-bench 
statements. In a 1982 speech he stated, “Congress must acknowledge its 
constitutional responsibility and begin to articulate its legislative judgments in 
constitutional terms.”75 If Congress fails to provide such an articulation, he 
continued, “I would contend that courts should rescind the rule that a legislative 
act is presumed to be constitutional. A presumption should not exist if it does 
not mirror a reality.”76 
Kennedy’s opinion in Beller, upholding the Navy’s policy to discharge 
those who engage in homosexual activity, expressed sensitivity to claims of 
individual rights, but ultimately upheld executive authority based on judicial 
deference to military necessity.77 Beller thus differs from a later opinion issued 
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals—written by Robert Bork and 
joined by Antonin Scalia—that rejected the challenge as having no right “solidly 
based in constitutional text and history” and simply applied a rational basis 
test.78  
Kennedy’s Beller opinion explicitly recognizes the plaintiffs’ claims that 
the policy violates their rights to substantive due process. Even before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,79 Kennedy notes “there is 
substantial academic comment which argues that the choice to engage in 
homosexual action is a personal decision entitled, at least in some instances, to 
recognition as a fundamental right and to full protection as an aspect of the 
 
 70. Id. at 5. 
 71. Id. at 8. 
 72. Id. at 8. 
 73. Id. at 8. 
 74. Id. at 8. 
 75. Anthony M. Kennedy, Judge, Ninth Cir., Address at the Los Angeles Patent Lawyers Association 9 
(Feb. 1982) (on file with the Journal) [hereinafter Kennedy, L.A. Patent Lawyer’s Assoc.]. 
 76. Id.  
 77. See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810–11 (9th Cir. 1980), overruled by Witt v. Dep’t of the Air 
Force, 527 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 78. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d. 1388, 1397–98 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 79. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
70.5-COLUCCI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2019  9:45 AM 
1150 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1141 
 
individual’s right to privacy.”80 He does admit “substantial authority to the 
contrary.”81 Nevertheless, he writes, “we can concede arguendo that the reasons 
which led the Court to protect certain private decisions intimately linked with 
one’s personality suggest that some kinds of government regulation of private 
consensual homosexual behavior may face substantial constitutional challenge” 
and “might be constitutionally protected activity in some other contexts.”82  
Using language that would appear in his Supreme Court opinion in 
Lawrence v. Texas,83 Kennedy states, “[t]he instant cases, however, are not ones 
in which the state seeks to use its criminal processes to coerce persons to comply 
with a moral precept even if they are consenting adults acting in private without 
injury to each other.”84 Focusing on the specific military policies challenged, he 
writes, “these appeals require an assessment of a military regulation which 
prohibits personnel from engaging in homosexual conduct while they are in the 
service.”85 Writing for the court, he held “that the importance of the government 
interests furthered, and to some extent the relative impracticality at this time of 
achieving the Government’s goals by regulations which turn more precisely on 
the facts of an individual case, outweigh whatever heightened solicitude is 
appropriate for consensual private homosexual conduct.”86 
Kennedy ruled such “heightened solicitude” is outweighed by the need for 
judicial deference to the considerations of military and foreign policy necessity 
advanced by the executive.87 “The nature of the employer—the Navy—is crucial 
to our decision.”88  
His opinion displays substantial judicial deference to the determinations of 
military necessity made by executive officials. “While it is clear that one does 
not surrender his or her constitutional rights upon entering the military,” such 
rights “must be viewed in light of the special circumstances and needs of the 
armed forces.”89 Kennedy cites, among these special needs, the effect on internal 
discipline and external foreign policy with other nations and finds “multiple 
grounds for the Navy to deem this regulation appropriate for the full and efficient 
accomplishment of its mission.”90 These include acting “to protect the fabric of 
military life, to preserve the integrity of the recruiting process, to maintain the 
discipline of personnel in active service, and to insure the acceptance of men and 
women in the military, who are sometimes stationed in foreign countries with 
 
 80. Beller, 632 F.2d at 809. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 810, 812. 
 83. Kennedy there states forming such relationships “is within the liberty of persons to choose without 
being punished as criminals.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 84. Beller, 632 F.2d at 810. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 811. 
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cultures different from our own.”91 Even if “concerns expressed by the Navy 
might not apply in any particular case, [they] do have some basis in fact. These 
considerations are enough to sustain the regulation in its military context.”92  
While the court is “mindful that the rule discharging these plaintiffs is a 
harsh one in their individual cases,” it “cannot under the guise of due process 
give our opinion on the fairness of every application of the military 
regulation.”93 Indeed, the opinion notes that “[u]pholding the challenged 
regulations as constitutional is distinct from a statement that they are wise.”94 
For Kennedy, “[t]he latter judgment is neither implicit in our decision nor within 
our province to make.”95 The opinion concludes, “the constitutionality of the 
regulations stems from the needs of the military, the Navy in particular, and from 
the unique accommodations between military demands and what might be 
constitutionally protected activity in some other contexts.”96  
And while “the Navy’s blanket rule requiring discharge . . . is perhaps 
broader than necessary to accomplish some of its goals, as the somewhat 
narrower regulation now in effect suggests” the policy as applied in the 
individual cases seems to “permit at least some flexibility.”97 Yet in considering 
the constitutionality of the mandatory discharge policy—as a judge— Kennedy 
defers to military and executive judgments: 
In view of the importance of the military’s role, the special need for discipline 
and order in the service, the potential for difficulties arising out of possible close 
confinement aboard ships or bases for long periods of time, and the possible 
benefit to recruiting efforts, however, we conclude that at the present time the 
regulation represents a reasonable effort to accommodate the needs of the 
Government with the interests of the individual.98 
Then-Judge Kennedy’s Ninth Circuit opinions in Chadha and in Beller 
offer previews of his approach to separation of powers on the Supreme Court 
and to his final concurring opinion in Trump. In these cases, Kennedy sees 
limitations federal power as essential to personal liberty and engages in an 
assertive judicial role to enforce these limits of each branch. Yet his primary 
concern is to limit the power of Congress and to preserve executive prerogatives. 
Further, in preserving executive power—particularly in relations with other 
nations—Kennedy admits the Constitution may not authorize judicial action to 
protect “what might be constitutionally protected activity in some other 
 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 812. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (emphasis added). 
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contexts.”99 In such areas, comments on the wisdom of executive policy are 
“neither implicit in our decision nor within our province to make.”100  
II.  JUSTICE KENNEDY, LIBERTY, AND JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SEPARATION 
OF POWERS  
Both before and during his tenure as a Justice, Kennedy continually argued 
that separation of powers promote individual liberty. “[T]he enforcement power 
of the judiciary,” Justice Kennedy stated in his confirmation hearing, “is to 
insure [sic] that the word liberty . . . is given its full and necessary meaning, 
consistent with the purposes of the document as we understand it.”101 For Justice 
Kennedy, personal liberty includes political interests in constitutional structure 
and judicial policing of the limits of the power of each branch of government. 
As he stated in a 1987 address shortly before his nomination, “it is legally wrong, 
morally wrong, ethically wrong, for an individual to surrender essential power 
over his or her personality to a remote government that he or she cannot control 
in a direct and practical way.”102 At his confirmation hearings, Justice Kennedy 
called such alienation of political liberty “spiritually wrong.”103 
On the Court, Justice Kennedy considered Congress as the remote authority 
and the greater threat to individual liberty. Even when federal legislation 
empowers the President beyond the limits of the Constitution, Justice Kennedy 
directs his criticism to congressional abdication rather than executive 
overreach.104 Further, his opinions focus on the functional effect of 
congressional and even judicial action on the ability of the president to exercise 
constitutional powers such as appointments, policy execution and foreign policy. 
In Bond v. United States,105 Justice Kennedy connects considerations of 
judicial enforcement of federalism and separation of powers, as he did in 
Chadha.106 Justice Kennedy states that the Constitution seeks “to protect each 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 122 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings] (emphasis 
added). 
  For three examples of judicial studies that find liberty central to understanding Kennedy, see FRANK J. 
COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY MEANING OF LIBERTY (2009) 
HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON LIBERTY (2009)); 
ANTHONY D. BARTL, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE KENNEDY: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY 
AND EQUALITY (2014). 
 102. Anthony M. Kennedy, Judge, Ninth Cir., Address at the Historical Society for the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California: Federalism: The Theory and the Reality 13 (Sept. 17, 1987) (on 
file with the Journal). 
 103. Hearings, supra note 101, at 200. 
 104. See infra notes 125–126. 
 105. 564 U.S. 211 (2011). 
 106. I explore Kennedy’s federalism in more depth in COLUCCI, supra note 101, at 135–39 and Frank J. 
Colucci, Justice Kennedy’s Federalism and the Limits of State Sovereignty, 49 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 
(forthcoming 2019). 
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branch of government from incursion by others.”107 Yet it also intends that “[t]he 
structural principles secured by the separation of powers protect the 
individual.”108 For this proposition, he cites Chadha.109 Although the legislative 
veto “diminished the role of the Executive,” to Justice Kennedy “[a] cardinal 
principle of separation of powers was vindicated at the insistence of an 
individual, indeed one who was not a citizen of the United States but who still 
was a person whose liberty was at risk.”110 He then continues: “If the 
constitutional structure of our Government that protects individual liberty is 
compromised, individuals who suffer otherwise justiciable injury may 
object.”111 “Just as it is appropriate for an individual, in a proper case, to invoke 
separation of powers or checks-and-balances constraints,” he concludes, “so too 
may a litigant, in a proper case, challenge a law as enacted in contravention of 
constitutional principles of federalism.”112  
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Clinton v. City of New York, striking 
congressional legislation granting the president a line-item veto, emphasized his 
connection between enforcing constitutional structure and preserving individual 
liberty.113 He writes in response to Justice Breyer, who claims that the allocation 
of powers among the branches is a political question.114 Justice Kennedy replies: 
“Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek to transgress 
the separation of powers.”115 To him, the branch clearly most likely to transgress 
is the most powerful one: Congress. As he writes, “[c]oncentration of power in 
the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty.”116  
In Clinton, Justice Kennedy does take a brief originalist turn: “[s]o 
convinced were the Framers that liberty of the person inheres in structure that at 
first they did not consider a Bill of Rights necessary.”117 For him, liberty is “not 
so confined” to “that word in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and as 
illuminated by the other provisions of the Bill of Rights.”118 Separation of 
powers, along with federalism, intended “to secure liberty in the fundamental 
political sense of the term, quite in addition to the idea of freedom from intrusive 
governmental acts.”119 To Justice Kennedy, this political sense reiterates the 
conception of political liberty: 
 
 107. Bond, 564 U.S. at 222. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. at 223. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 223–24. 
 113. 524 U.S. 417, 449–53 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 114. See id. at 469–97 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Id.  
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The idea and the promise were that when people delegate some degree of control 
to a remote central authority, one branch of government ought not possess the 
power to shape their destiny without a sufficient check from the other two. In this 
vision, liberty demands limits on the ability of any one branch to influence basic 
political decisions.120 
As in other aspects of his jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy focused on 
taxation: “It follows that if a citizen who is taxed has the measure of the tax or 
the decision to spend determined by the Executive alone, without adequate 
control by the citizen’s Representatives in Congress, liberty is threatened.”121 
The presidential veto “establishes a new mechanism which gives the President 
the sole ability to hurt a group that is a visible target, in order to disfavor the 
group or to extract further concessions from Congress.”122 The individual “loses 
liberty in a real sense . . . [without] traditional constitutional constraints.”123 
Justice Kennedy finds “[t]he law is the functional equivalent of a line item 
veto and enhances the President’s powers beyond what the Framers would have 
endorsed.”124 Ultimately, however, he blames Congress for this constitutional 
violation. “That a congressional cession of power is voluntary,” he writes, “does 
not make it innocuous.”125 Even if the law might act “to restrain persistent 
excessive spending. . . . Abdication of responsibility is not part of the 
constitutional design.”126 
Justice Kennedy ties his conception of judicial authority to enforce 
separation of powers in the name of liberty to Chadha, although this vision of 
Chadha seems to reflect more his functional analysis for the Ninth Circuit than 
Justice Burger’s textualism for the Supreme Court majority. Justice Kennedy 
reiterates his ideal that separation of powers “operates on a horizontal axis to 
secure a proper balance of legislative, executive and judicial authority.”127 It also 
“operates on a vertical axis . . . between each branch and the citizens in whose 
interests powers must be exercised.”128 For him, “[t]he citizen has a vital interest 
in the regularity of the exercise of governmental power.”129 As he elaborates, 
“[i]f this point was not clear before Chadha, it should have been so afterwards.” 
Despite the differences in the cases, he finds they share a concern about this 
direct relationship. “By increasing the power of the President beyond what the 
Framers envisioned the statute compromises the political liberty of our citizens, 
liberty which the separation of powers seeks to secure.”130 
 
 120. Id. at 450–51. 
 121. Id. at 451. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 452. 
 126. Id. at 449, 452. 
 127. Id. at 452. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
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The Clinton opinion concludes with a shot at Congress: “The Constitution 
is not bereft of controls over improvident spending.”131 One is his beloved 
federalism, “for political accountability is easier to enforce within the States than 
nationwide.”132 The other “is control of the political branches by an informed 
and responsible electorate.”133 He concludes by noting that “[t]he Framers of the 
Constitution could not command statesmanship. They could simply provide 
structures from which it might emerge.”134 Their failure “cannot validate an 
otherwise unconstitutional device.”135 
Justice Kennedy expresses his conception of the judicial role in enforcing 
separation of powers in several other cases. His concurring opinion in Public 
Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, joined by Justices Rehnquist and 
O’Connor, examines more deeply how using the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (FACA) to obtain records on presidential use of American Bar Association 
ratings of potential judicial nominees constitutes an intrusion on the 
Executive.136 Justice Kennedy writes allowing this request would allow 
Congress to “interfere with the President’s constitutional prerogative to 
nominate federal judges.”137 
Justice Kennedy uses Public Citizen as a vehicle for justifying judicial 
enforcement of separation of powers and judicial policing of Congress. To 
Kennedy, “[i]t remains one of the most vital functions of this Court to police 
with care the separation of the governing powers.”138 He admits, in this case, 
“no immediate threat to liberty is apparent.” Nevertheless, he writes, “when 
structure fails, liberty is always in peril.”139 
While Justice Kennedy later states FACA, as applied in this case, “would 
be a plain violation of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution,” his analysis 
is not textual but primarily functional.140 Under Article II, he writes, “[n]o role 
whatsoever is given either to the Senate or to Congress as a whole in the process 
of choosing the person who will be nominated for appointment.”141 When the 
power is exclusive to the President, “we have refused to tolerate any intrusion 
by the Legislative Branch.”142 Among the cases cited is Chadha, but Justice 
Kennedy’s focus here is more textual: he cites Justice Burger’s Supreme Court 
opinion, which resting on the presentment clause, rather than his own Ninth 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 452–53.  
 135. Id. at 453. 
 136. 491 U.S. 440, 467 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 137. Id. at 469.  
 138. Id. at 468. 
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 140. Id. at 482. 
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 142. Id. at 485.  
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Circuit opinion.143 As Justice Kennedy writes, “[i]t is improper for this Court to 
arrogate to itself the power to adjust a balance settled by the explicit terms of the 
Constitution.”144 Instead, he states, “we are empowered to act in particular cases 
to prevent any other Branch from undertaking to alter them.”145 
While the bulk of the opinion relies on textualism, the final paragraph does 
move more toward a functionalist approach: “It is also plain that the application 
of FACA would constitute a direct and real interference with the President’s 
exclusive responsibility to nominate federal judges.”146 As he concludes, “[t]he 
mere fact that FACA would regulate so as to interfere with the manner in which 
the President obtains information necessary to discharge his duty assigned under 
the Constitution to nominate federal judges is enough to invalidate the Act.”147 
In Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, another case 
involving FACA, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion limited attempts by 
Judicial Watch and Sierra Club to obtain discovery about the composition and 
meetings of the National Energy Development Group created to advise the 
president and vice president.148 The opinion allowed for limitations that “might 
interfere with officials in the discharge of their duties and impinge on the 
President’s constitutional prerogatives,” even when executive privilege is not 
specifically invoked.149 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion justifies limits on discovery by focusing on the 
identity of the party. Limiting discovery acts to “give recognition to the 
paramount necessity of protecting the Executive Branch from vexation litigation 
that might distract it from the energetic performance of its constitutional 
duties.”150 Interpreting Congress’s intent in FACA raises “separation-of-powers 
considerations” and should “prevent a lower court from interfering with a 
coequal branch’s ability to discharge its constitutional responsibilities.”151  
Justice Kennedy notes that, unlike the litigation in United States v. Nixon, 
this is a civil case.152 He focuses on the “burden imposed by discovery orders,” 
the lack of checks on civil discovery, and that the requests in this case “ask for 
everything under the sky,” are “similarly unbounded,” and “anything but 
appropriate.”153 They would provide anything the party would want “and much 
more besides.”154 He concludes, even “Nixon does not require the Executive 
 
 143. See id. at 486.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 487. 
 146. Id. at 488.  
 147. Id. at 488–89. 
 148. 542 U.S. 367, 380–82 (2004). 
 149. Id. at 372–73. 
 150. Id. at 382. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 383–84 (citing 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974)). 
 153. Id. at 385, 387–88. 
 154. Id. at 388.  
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Branch to bear the onus of critiquing the unacceptable discovery requests line 
by line.”155 
Justice Kennedy notes the “burden imposed by the discovery orders” and 
the “overly broad discovery requests approved by the District Court in this 
case.”156 As he notes, “special considerations control when the Executive 
Branch’s interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding 
the confidentiality of its communications are implicated.”157 
Given these burdens, the Executive Branch should have other options 
besides simply invoking executive privilege. That privilege “is an extraordinary 
assertion of power” in which “coequal branches of the Government are set on a 
collision course.”158 Such a claim requires courts to “balanc[e] the need for 
information in a judicial proceeding and the Executive’s Article II 
prerogatives.”159 This “places courts in [an] awkward position” and—as Nixon 
stated—“should be avoided whenever possible.”160 Any belief that limitation 
requires invocation of executive privilege and this inevitable conflict is a 
“mistaken assumption” and a “mistaken reading” of Nixon “that the assertion of 
executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Government’s separation-
of-powers objections.”161 Rather, “all courts should be mindful of the burdens 
imposed on the Executive Branch in any future proceedings.”162 Here, the 
“[s]pecial considerations applicable to President and to the Vice President 
suggest that courts should be sensitive to requests by the Government.”163 
Justice Kennedy’s deference in Trump contrasts with his concurrence just 
a month earlier in Pereira v. Sessions, which advocated considering a more 
active role for courts in policing separation of powers.164 His short Pereira 
concurrence addresses the questions he presented in his Ninth Circuit Chadha 
opinion and makes explicit his support for reviewing the actions of agencies, 
finally rejecting the “reflexive deference”165 he finds in decisions following 
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.166 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Pereira presents a sharp contrast 
with his final concurrence in Trump. Pereira, like Chadha, involved an 
immigrant challenging his removal.167 Justice Kennedy joined Justice 
Sotomayor’s majority opinion finding that the “stop time” rule—determined by 
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 156. Id. at 385–86. 
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 158. Id. at 389. 
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 160. Id. at 389–90. 
 161. Id. at 391.  
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 164. 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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 166. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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the Attorney General under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act—is not triggered when a written notice to appear fails to 
specify a time and date.168 “The plain text, the statutory context, and common 
sense,” to Justice Sotomayor, “all lead inescapably and unambiguously to that 
conclusion.”169 Dissenting, Justice Alito argues “a straightforward application 
of Chevron requires us to accept the Government’s construction of the provision 
at issue.”170 
Justice Kennedy responds directly “to note [his] concern with the way in 
which the Court’s opinion in Chevron has come to be understood and 
applied.”171 To him such “cursory analysis” by courts “suggests an abdication 
of the Judiciary’s proper role in interpreting federal statutes.”172 He finds “the 
type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of these cases . . . troubling.”173 
He continues: “[W]hen deference is applied to other questions of statutory 
interpretation, such as an agency’s interpretation of the statutory provisions that 
concern the scope of its own authority, it is more troubling still.”174 With this 
statement, Justice Kennedy reiterated the concern he expressed in his 1984 
public speech explaining Chadha that it remains “a problem of modern political 
science to design the remedy for “a sprawling federal bureaucracy” that has 
grown “uncontrolled.”175 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Pereira suggests part of a modern 
remedy. Citing opinions from Justices Roberts, Thomas and Gorsuch, Justice 
Kennedy writes that “[g]iven the concerns raised by some Members of this 
Court, it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, 
the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that 
decision.”176 He concludes that “[t]he proper rules for interpreting statutes and 
determining agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should accord 
with constitutional separation-of-powers principles and the function and 
province of the Judiciary.”177 This final concurrence, where Justice Kennedy 
rejects “reflexive deference” and advocates for an enhanced judicial role, 
drastically contrasts with his Trump concurrence. 
Justice Kennedy’s broader separation of powers approach on the Court 
expands upon the framework he articulated on the Ninth Circuit in Chadha and 
Beller. His opinions reject “reflexive deference,” and advocate for an assertive 
judiciary to police the other branches in order to preserve individual liberty and 
 
 168. Id. at 2110. 
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 170. Id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. at 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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 174. Id. 
 175. Kennedy, Hoover Lecture, supra note 29, at 4. 
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the regular exercise of power. His opinions also consider congressional 
overreach and judicial intrusion to be greater threats than executive overreach.  
III.  BOUMEDIENE: RECONCILING LIBERTY AND SECURITY UNDER LAW 
Justice Kennedy did join and write for majorities in several cases after 2001 
and voted to strike government actions that violated the rights of enemy 
combatants. These decisions culminated with his 2008 opinion for the Court in 
Boumediene v. Bush.178 However, even when those decisions had the effect of 
limiting executive power, his opinions expressed greater concern with the 
inability of Congress to justify departures from existing law and policy. They 
also presumed an essential role for courts as neutral or impartial factfinders in 
balancing liberty and security within the framework of law. 
In earlier cases involving those detained at Guantanamo after September 
11, 2001, Justice Kennedy expressed willingness to use judicial power to limit 
executive power and to protect habeas corpus as part of his ideal of separation 
of powers to vindicate individual liberty. In Rasul v. Bush,179 he concurred that 
federal courts have the jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges brought by 
detainees.180 Against claims of military necessity, his opinion finds that under 
the indefinite lease of the base, “Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a 
United States territory, and it is one far removed from any hostilities.”181 
Kennedy concludes that “courts maintain the power and the responsibility 
to protect persons from unlawful detention even where military affairs are 
implicated.”182 Detainees “are being held indefinitely, and without benefit of any 
legal proceeding to determine their status.”183 The government claim of a power 
to detain indefinitely “suggests a weaker case of military necessity and much 
greater alignment with the traditional function of habeas corpus.”184 He 
concedes that in transport “detention without proceedings or trial would be 
justified by military necessity for a matter of weeks.”185 Yet for those held, “as 
the period of detention stretches from months to years, the case for continued 
detention to meet military exigencies becomes weaker.”186 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence finds Military 
Commission Order No. 1 “exceeds limits that certain statutes, duly enacted by 
Congress, have placed on the President’s authority to convene military 
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courts.”187 He fears military tribunals “without independent review.”188 Echoing 
his statements from earlier cases, he reiterates: “[c]oncentration of power puts 
personal liberty in peril of arbitrary action by officials, an incursion the 
Constitution’s three-part system is designed to avoid.”189 
Justice Kennedy contrasts the newly created military commissions with 
“regular military courts in our system,” established by Congress, finding 
“several noteworthy departures.”190 He notes that, “[a]t a minimum a military 
commission like the one at issue—a commission specially convened by the 
President to try specific persons without express congressional authorization—
can be ‘regularly constituted’ by the standards of our military justice system only 
if some practical need explains deviations.”191 He discusses rules from the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, including who can serve as a judge, the 
powers that officials can exercise at trial, appointing commission members, and 
routing of review and appeals.192 “[T]he greater powers of the Appointing 
Authority . . . raise concerns that the commission’s decisionmaking may not be 
neutral.”193 These differences “remove safeguards that are important to the 
fairness of the proceedings and the independence of the court.”194 Thus the new 
commissions “cannot be considered regularly constituted under United States 
law and thus does not satisfy Congress’ requirement that military commissions 
conform to the law of war.”195 Justice Kennedy concedes that, “[b]ecause 
Congress has prescribed these limits, Congress can change them, requiring a 
new analysis consistent with the Constitution and other governing laws.”196 
In Boumediene v. Bush, Justice Kennedy wrote for a 5–4 majority 
reaffirming that Guantanamo detainees “have the habeas corpus privilege,” for 
which the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) and Military Commissions Act 
(MCA) do not provide “an adequate and effective substitute.”197 Yet his primary 
concern was whether the DTA passed by Congress was consistent with the role 
for courts provided the Suspension Clause, which “protects the rights of the 
detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to 
account.”198 After finding “doubt” in the record, he decides to “decline . . . to 
infer too much, one way or the other, from the lack of historical evidence on 
point.”199 
 
 187. 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 188. Id. at 638. 
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 193. Id. at 650.  
 194. Id. at 651. 
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 196. Id. at 653. 
 197. 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008). 
 198. Id. at 745; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 199. Boumediene, 533 U.S. at 752. 
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While it is the executive who detains prisoners, the constitutional criticisms 
Justice Kennedy launches in Boumediene aim squarely at Congress. He states 
that “here we confront statutes, the DTA and the MCA, that were intended to 
circumscribe habeas review.”200 Unlike other laws “coextensive with traditional 
habeas corpus,” Justice Kennedy finds, in limiting regulating jurisdiction and 
grounds for appeal, Congress “intended the Court of Appeals to have a more 
limited role in enemy combatant status determinations than a district court has 
in habeas corpus proceedings.”201  
For Justice Kennedy’s functional definition, “[w]hat matters is the sum 
total of procedural protections afforded to the detainee at all stages, direct and 
collateral.”202 Yet he process does not suffice: “Even when the procedures 
authorizing detention are structurally sound, the Suspension Clause remains 
applicable and the writ relevant.”203 As he concludes, “when the judicial power 
to issue habeas corpus properly is invoked the judicial officer must have 
adequate authority to make a determination in light of the relevant law and facts 
and to formulate and issue appropriate orders for relief, including, if necessary, 
an order directing the prisoner’s release.”204 Any re-examination of procedures 
should “come close to reinstating the § 2241 habeas corpus process Congress 
sought to deny them.”205 The MCA, supplemented by the DTA, “cannot bear 
this interpretation.”206 Congress provided “an inadequate substitute for habeas 
corpus” and “effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.”207 
Justice Kennedy explicitly acknowledges “[t]he real risks, the real threats, 
of terrorist attacks are constant and not soon likely to abate.”208 He admits, as in 
Rasul, that “[p]ractical considerations and exigent circumstances inform the 
definition and reach of the law’s writs.”209 These may require that habeas not 
“be available at the moment the prisoner is taken into custody.”210 But, he writes, 
“[t]he cases before us, however, do not involve detainees who have been held 
for a short period of time.”211 Some have been held for six years or more.212 
“[T]he costs of delay can no longer be borne by those who are held in 
custody.”213  
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Justice Kennedy’s Boumediene opinion concludes with a statement about 
the “proper deference” that should be given to “political branches.”214 He 
especially mentions the President’s “substantial authority to apprehend and 
detain those who pose a real danger to our security.”215 Further, he states, “[o]ur 
opinion does not undermine the Executive’s powers as Commander in Chief.”216 
The final section, however, provides no similar respect to Congress as an 
institution. It mentions “some designated Members of Congress” who “begin the 
day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and 
its people.”217 They are among “[t]he political branches” who, “consistent with 
their independent obligations to interpret and uphold the Constitution, can 
engage in a genuine debate about how best to preserve constitutional values 
while protecting the Nation from terrorism.”218 
In the end, Justice Kennedy sees both habeas—“a right of first 
importance”—and the judiciary as central to “fidelity to freedom’s first 
principles.”219 “Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful 
restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation 
of powers” which produce “the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas 
corpus relief.”220 He admits “[t]he laws and Constitution are designed to survive, 
and remain in force, in extraordinary times”221 and concludes, “[l]iberty and 
security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the 
framework of the law.”222 
IV.  JUSTICE KENNEDY AND PRESERVATION OF EXECUTIVE PRIMACY IN 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
While Justice Kennedy enforced limits on executive power in areas 
involving enemy combatants after 2001, in other areas over the same timeframe 
he consistently employed judicial power to preserve and protect the exercise of 
executive power from interferences by Congress and the courts. In several cases, 
he concedes that substantial claims to liberty are at stake, yet he supports judicial 
deference to executive decisions in areas concerning national defense and 
foreign affairs for fear of congressional or judicial intrusion on executive 
policymaking. 
In later cases, Justice Kennedy preserved executive power and presidential 
primacy concerning foreign affairs. In Zadvydas v. Davis, he dissented from 
Breyer’s majority opinion interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act to 
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prevent federal detention of removable aliens more than ninety days beyond the 
completion of their removal period if considered by the Attorney General to be 
a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with removal after the completion 
of their sentence.223 Justice Kennedy admits “[t]he aliens’ claims are substantial; 
their plight is real.”224 Yet, in the end, “a removable alien does not have the same 
liberty interest as a citizen does.”225 More fundamentally, for Justice Kennedy, 
the time limit imposed by the majority may infringe on the inherent authority of 
the Executive Branch to conduct negotiations with other nations.226  
Justice Kennedy emphasizes “the obvious necessity that the Nation speak 
with one voice on immigration and foreign affairs matters.”227 With this limit, 
he writes, “other countries can effect the release of these individuals back into 
the American community” and “may ignore or disclaim responsibility to accept 
their return.”228 He characterizes this effect as “interference with sensitive 
foreign relations [and] becomes even more acute where hostility or tension 
characterizes the relationship, for other countries can use the fact of judicially 
mandated release to their strategic advantage, refusing the return of their 
nationals to force dangerous aliens upon us.”229  
Justice Kennedy fears that courts “can expand or contract the reasonable 
period of detention based on [their] own assessment of the course of negotiations 
with foreign powers.”230 This judicial power “goes far to undercut the position 
of the Executive in repatriation negotiations” and has the effect of “weakening 
the hand of our Government.”231 He concludes with concern that judicial 
consideration of foreseeability of removal “would require the Executive Branch 
to surrender its primacy in foreign affairs and submit reports to the courts 
respecting its ongoing negotiations in the international sphere.”232 
In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, Justice Kennedy reasserted his commitment to 
protecting executive foreign policy prerogatives from congressional 
interference.233 He joined liberal Justices in the Zivotofsky majority and wrote 
an opinion to emphasize the need for the nation to speak with one voice in 
foreign policy in terms of recognizing other nations.234 His opinion appeals to 
the text of the Constitution, including the Reception Clause and treaty making 
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power of Article II, by using original intent and historical practice and 
understanding .235 
 Ultimately, however, Kennedy relies on “functional considerations.”236 
“Put simply the Nation must have a single policy regarding which governments 
are legitimate in the eyes of the United States.”237 As he reiterates, “[t]hese 
assurances cannot be equivocal,” and “[t]hat voice must be the President’s.”238 
The presidency “has the characteristic of unity at all times.”239 “The President is 
capable, in ways Congress is not, of engaging in the delicate and often secret 
diplomatic contacts that may lead to a decision on recognition,” and “is also 
better positioned to take the decisive, unequivocal action necessary to recognize 
other states at international law.”240 
Justice Kennedy admits recognition of other nations “is just one part of a 
political process that may require Congress to make laws,” but finds that 
functionally “the exclusive recognition power is essential to the conduct of 
Presidential duties.”241 It is “an executive power that Congress may not 
qualify.”242 Kennedy focuses on effects: “If the President is to be effective in 
negotiations over a formal recognition determination, it must be evident to his 
counterparts abroad that he speaks for the Nation on that precise question.”243 
He concedes, “[i]t is not for the President alone to determine the whole 
content of the Nation’s foreign policy” and that “it is essential the congressional 
role in foreign affairs be understood and respected.”244 Nevertheless, 
“[r]ecognition is an act with immediate and powerful significance for 
international relations, so the President’s position must be clear.”245 Thus, in the 
interest in speaking with one voice, “Congress cannot require him to contradict 
his own statement regarding a determination of formal recognition.”246  
Justice Kennedy reasons from this exclusive executive recognition power 
that Congress’s act to require a specific nation to be noted on a passport to be an 
unconstitutional intrusion. “That congressional command would not only 
prevent the Nation from speaking with one voice but also prevent the Executive 
itself from doing so in conducting foreign relations.”247 Place of birth is 
considered “an official executive statement implicating recognition.”248 While 
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he admits “Congress has substantial authority over passports,” he concludes 
“[t]o allow Congress to control the President’s communication in the context of 
a formal recognition determination is to allow Congress to exercise that 
exclusive power itself.”249 In the interest of speaking with one voice in foreign 
policy, the Legislative Branch cannot “command the President to contradict an 
earlier recognition determination in the issuance of passports.”250 
In Ziglar v. Abbasi, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion held that those 
detained after September 11 who may have suffered abuse, discrimination, and 
violations of constitutional rights before removal could not sue the federal agents 
and wardens responsible.251 While the opinion mentioned that the Plaintiff’s 
theory of liability was based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics 
Agents,252 he argued that the now-“disfavored” doctrine arose when “the Court 
followed a different approach to recognizing implied causes of action than it 
follows now,” one “far more cautious.”253 He specifically cites separation-of-
powers principles as a justification for refusing expansion.254  
As in earlier opinions, Kennedy stresses how such litigation can influence 
the exercise of executive power. “Claims against federal officials often create 
substantial costs, in the form of defense and indemnification,” he writes.255 “In 
addition, the time and administrative costs attendant upon intrusions resulting 
from the discovery and trial process are significant factors to be considered.”256 
Kennedy finds courts ill-suited to weigh “the projected costs and consequences 
to the Government itself when the tort and monetary liability mechanisms of the 
legal system are used to bring about the proper formulation and implementation 
of public policies.”257 
In Ziglar, arising after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Justice Kennedy 
expressed concern about “special factors” that include the effect of discovery 
and publicity about public policy choices made by the executive and by high-
ranking officials.258 Even in suits brought against an individual official, he 
writes, “these claims would call into question the formulation and 
implementation of a general policy. This, in turn, would necessarily require 
inquiry and discovery into the whole course of the discussions and deliberations 
that led to the policies and governmental acts being challenged.”259 He fears “the 
burden and demand of litigation might well prevent them—or, to be more 
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precise, future officials like them—from devoting the time and effort required 
for the proper discharge of their duties.”260 For this proposition he cites his own 
opinion in Cheney.261 
Justice Kennedy fears the implications of a “discovery and litigation 
process would either border upon or directly implicate the discussion and 
deliberations that led to the formation of the policy in question.”262 For Justice 
Kennedy, “[a]llowing a damages suit in this context, or in a like context in other 
circumstances, would require courts to interfere in an intrusive way with 
sensitive functions of the Executive Branch.”263 Further, this litigation has the 
potential to “challenge . . . major elements of the Government’s whole response 
to the September 11 attacks, thus of necessity requiring an inquiry into sensitive 
issues of national security.”264 But, “[n]ational-security policy is the prerogative 
of the Congress and President.”265 Thus, “[t]he risk of personal damages liability 
is more likely to cause an official to second-guess difficult but necessary 
decisions concerning national-security policy.”266 
 This decision, Kennedy admits, may result in “insufficient deterrence to 
prevent officers from violating the Constitution.”267 He concedes “some 
executive actions have the sweeping potential to affect the liberty of so many is 
a reason to consider proper means to impose restraint and to provide some 
redress from injury.”268 Nonetheless, in this case his greater fear is that “high 
officers who face personal liability for damages might refrain from taking urgent 
and lawful action in a time of crisis. And, as already noted, the costs and 
difficulties of later litigation might intrude upon and interfere with the proper 
exercise of their office.”269 He recognizes the need for “balance to be struck, in 
situations like this one, between deterring constitutional violations and freeing 
high officials to make the lawful decisions necessary to protect the Nation in 
times of great peril.”270 Yet he finds, “[t]he proper balance is one for the 
Congress, not the Judiciary, to undertake.”271  
In these opinions leading to Trump, Justice Kennedy expresses further 
commitment to preserving executive power. He goes beyond form to assess the 
practical effect congressional legislation and judicial proceedings will have on 
the ability of the President and executive officials to design and implement 
foreign policy and influence relations with other nations. He acknowledges the 
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effect these decisions may have on individual liberty and the ability to hold 
officials accountable for violations of the Constitution, but his commitment to 
constitutional structure mandates judicial deference to the Executive to prevent 
intrusion or interference with the primary role of the Executive in speaking for 
the nation as well as making and implementing foreign policy. 
V.  TRUMP V. HAWAII: RECONCILING “SUBSTANTIAL DEFERENCE” AND 
“FREEDOM THAT LASTS” 
Justice Kennedy’s short concurrence in Trump is notable for four reasons: 
what it says; what it does not say; the case it cites; and the cases it alludes to, but 
does not explicitly cite. His final words as a Justice seek to reassure but instead 
project concern. 
If the constitutional issue is as straightforward as the majority and Justice 
Kennedy suggest, the final two paragraphs of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
seem unnecessary. He joined “in full” Roberts’s majority opinion, which finds: 
“Under these circumstances, the Government has set forth a sufficient national 
security justification to survive rational basis review.”272 Justice Roberts further 
asserted that “[w]e express no view on the soundness of the policy. We simply 
hold today that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 
merits of their constitutional claim.”273 In “further observation,” Justice 
Kennedy finds “appropriate” to explicitly recognize the costs of executive 
deference and a reconsideration of which branch is most likely to sacrifice 
liberty the most.274 
Rather than rejecting the “reflexive deference” he finds “troubling” in 
Pereira,275 Kennedy’s Trump opinion relies on “the substantial deference that is 
and must be accorded to the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs”276 
characteristic of his earlier opinions. His Trump concurrence is notable for what 
it does not say—and the cases it does not cite—and for its target audience. 
Justice Kennedy notes that “there may be some common ground” between 
the majority and dissent.277 Both, in his view, suggest “governmental action may 
be subject to judicial review to determine whether or not it is ‘inexplicable by 
anything but animus,’ which in this case would be animosity to a religion.”278 
His statement about the constitutional responsibility in this case is more striking 
for what it omits than for what it says. To support this proposition of common 
ground that courts “in some instances” have the power to review government 
actions as “‘inexplicable by anything but animus,’” Kennedy quotes his own 
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majority opinion in Romer v. Evans,279 which struck a Colorado constitutional 
Amendment because it “identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them 
protection across the board.”280  
Romer is the only case Justice Kennedy cites in his Trump concurrence. 
But other relevant opinions are implicit in his argument. On the point of animus 
based on religion, Justice Kennedy does not cite the opinion that most directly 
addresses animosity to religion: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City 
of Hialeah.281 There Justice Kennedy articulates a “fundamental nonpersecution 
principle of the First Amendment,”282 finding government action “violated the 
Nation’s essential commitment to religious freedom.”283  
In finding impermissible animus against Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye 
and the Santeria religion, Justice Kennedy’s opinion considered “both direct and 
circumstantial evidence.”284 For him, “[r]elevant evidence includes, among 
other things, the historical background of the decision under challenge, the 
specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, 
and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous 
statements made by members of the decisionmaking body.”285 Considering the 
evidence in depth, he concludes “the neutrality inquiry leads to one conclusion: 
The ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion.”286 
The consideration of background context as well as “both direct and 
circumstantial evidence” that was critical to Justice Kennedy’s rationale in 
Church of the Lukumi and in Romer, however, conflicts with his commitment to 
executive prerogative in the area of foreign affairs. Even some of the dissenters 
in Trump express willingness to allow the government greater chance to make 
the case for the constitutionality of the ban. Justice Breyer, for example, 
concedes “[d]eclarations, anecdotal evidence, facts, and numbers taken 
from amicus briefs are not judicial factfindings. The Government has not had an 
opportunity to respond, and a court has not had an opportunity to decide.”287 
This reality raises a dilemma for Justice Kennedy. Judicial examination of 
such “direct and circumstantial evidence” raises concerns he mentioned in 
previous cases. Alluding—though not referring—to the effects of discovery he 
stated in Cheney and in Zivotofsky, Justice Kennedy then states “even if further 
proceedings are permitted, it would be necessary to determine that any discovery 
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and other preliminary matters would not themselves intrude on the foreign 
affairs power of the Executive.”288 
Justice Kennedy attempts to balance his commitments to executive 
deference and to an aggressive judicial power to define and enforce the full and 
necessary meaning of liberty. Under the Constitution, he admits, “[t]here are 
numerous instances in which the statements and actions of Government officials 
are not subject to judicial scrutiny or intervention.”289 For Justice Kennedy, 
however, “[t]hat does not mean those officials are free to disregard the 
Constitution and the rights it proclaims and protects.”290 The obligation to 
uphold their oath to the Constitution “is not confined to those spheres in which 
the Judiciary can correct or even comment upon what those officials say or 
do.”291 
  Kennedy’s statement in Trump echoes his 1980 Ninth Circuit writing in 
Beller that courts cannot “give our opinion on the fairness of every application 
of the military regulation.”292 Beller reiterated “[u]pholding the challenged 
regulations as constitutional is distinct from a statement that they are wise,” as 
“[t]he latter judgment is neither implicit in our decision nor within our province 
to make.”293 In Trump, however, Justice Kennedy’ doubts expressed on behalf 
of an “anxious world”294 itself serves as an implicit comment on the travel ban.  
Justice Kennedy’s final two paragraphs in Trump echo faintly the final 
words of his earlier, uncited opinion concerning unconstitutional official animus 
against religion. In Church of the Lukumi, Kennedy concludes: 
The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to religious tolerance, 
and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from 
animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to 
remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures. 
Those in office must be resolute in resisting importunate demands and must 
ensure that the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law and regulation are 
secular. Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to 
persecute or oppress a religion or its practices. The laws here in question were 
enacted contrary to these constitutional principles, and they are void.295 
In Trump, Justice Kennedy sounds similar themes to seek to reassert this 
constitutional meaning and promise. He concludes “the very fact that an official 
may have broad discretion, discretion free from judicial scrutiny, makes it all the 
more imperative for him or her to adhere to the Constitution and to its meaning 
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and its promise.”296 He reiterates the importance of protections of “freedom of 
belief and expression” and writes “[i]t is an urgent necessity that officials adhere 
to these constitutional guarantees and mandates in all their actions, even in the 
sphere of foreign affairs.”297 While his closing words about constitutional 
commitments may have soothed in Church of the Lukumi, they ring hollow in 
the context of the Trump decision.  
Kennedy’s “further observation”298 in Trump attempts to reconcile his 
reading of the Constitution with constitutional structure based on executive 
deference. If some constitutional and executive behavior is beyond “those 
spheres in which the Judiciary can correct or even comment upon what those 
officials say or do,” then who is the audience?299 What need is there for a 
disclaimer that even when “statements and actions of Government officials are 
not subject to judicial scrutiny or intervention. That does not mean those officials 
are free to disregard the Constitution and the rights it proclaims and protects”?300 
Why emphasize that “[t]he oath that all officials take to adhere to the 
Constitution is not confined to those [judicial] spheres”?301  
The tension Kennedy identifies in Trump between executive discretion, the 
Constitution, and the oath appears uncited, yet clear, references to Chief Justice 
Marshall’s foundational opinion in Marbury v. Madison.302 Marshall states early 
in Marbury that “[b]y the Constitution of the United States, the President is 
invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is 
to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political 
character, and to his own conscience.”303 He continues, “whatever opinion may 
be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still 
there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are 
political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and, being entrusted to 
the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.”304 
Marshall in Marbury also invokes the constitutional oath as a limit on 
unconstitutional action by the officials who take it.305 In discussing the duty of 
judges to enforce a written constitution, he notes “the principle, supposed to be 
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is 
void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that 
instrument.”306 Marshall, too, appeals to the oath judges take:  
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Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution 
of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government? [I]f it 
is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him? 
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To 
prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime.307 
In Trump, Justice Kennedy reinforces that “the very fact that an official 
may have broad discretion, discretion free from judicial scrutiny, makes it all the 
more imperative for him or her to adhere to the Constitution and to its meaning 
and its promise.”308 This appears a concession that, perhaps, the Constitution is 
not enough, and recognition that an oath to adhere to it cannot be enforced.  
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Trump, ultimately, is best understood as 
an appeal to conscience: to the conscience of executive officials, and to that of 
the President himself. Only in this way does his lecture about the First 
Amendment concerning establishment, free exercise of religion, and “freedom 
of belief and expression” make sense.309 Justice Kennedy implies the current 
Executive Branch either poses a threat to those values or can reasonably be 
perceived as one. “It is an urgent necessity that officials adhere to these 
constitutional guarantees and mandates in all their actions, even in the sphere of 
foreign affairs.”310 He hopes that this adherence to constitutional guarantees will 
occur, speaking for “an anxious world,” one that “must know that our 
Government remains committed always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to 
preserve and protect, so that freedom extends outward, and lasts.”311 Yet 
Kennedy’s expression of hope implies fear, anxiety, and doubt—if not about 
whether courts should defer to the executive, then about whether such deference 
truly serves the values that the Constitution is designed to secure. 
VI.  FURTHER OBSERVATIONS: COULD CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IMPERIL 
LIBERTY? 
Justice Kennedy’s final opinion in Trump both reflects the constitutional 
commitments to executive power he has asserted throughout his career and casts 
doubt upon the assumptions behind his larger separation of powers 
jurisprudence. Dating from his Chadha opinion on the Ninth Circuit, he has 
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aggressively used judicial power to vindicate separation of powers. The opinion 
and decision in Trump reflect his ideals—dating back to Beller—of deferring to 
executive power, particularly in areas that implicate aspects of foreign affairs. 
He has been especially attentive to both legislative and judicial actions that may 
intrude on the core powers of the executive. 
Justice Kennedy’s larger separation of powers jurisprudence initially 
operated on two assumptions: that constitutional structure promotes liberty, and 
that Congress is the branch most likely to threaten it. Justice Kennedy’s vote and 
passionate words in Trump cast doubt on both of these premises. His earlier view 
of the Constitution—as he stated in Boumediene presumes that liberty and 
security can be reconciled within framework of law. Several of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinions—from Beller to Zadvydas to Ziglar to Trump—suggest 
structure itself may shield executive officials from accountability under the law 
for violations of liberty. 
His concurrence in Trump offers a final lesson about the nature of liberty, 
the Constitution, and the essential limits of judicial power. Justice Kennedy was 
the Justice most likely to strike laws for violating the Constitution,312 leading 
one scholar to conclude he placed “no areas of law and policy off limits to 
judicial action.”313 From his confirmation, Justice Kennedy has expressed liberty 
as the highest constitutional value and advocated a judicial duty “to insure that 
the word ‘liberty’ in the Constitution is given its full and necessary meaning, 
consistent with the purposes of the document as we understand it.”314 
Throughout his career, Justice Kennedy emphasized liberty as the first and 
last words of significant opinions protecting individual rights.315 He has joined 
opinions stating “[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt,”316 and 
that, “[w]hen contending parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it 
becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional 
issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.”317  
Yet Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Trump introduces doubt about the 
extent of that judicial responsibility and about whether constitutional structure 
and deference to the executive in the area of foreign policy really do promote 
liberty. He questions “[w]hether judicial proceedings may properly continue in 
this case” and whether “it would be necessary to determine that any discovery 
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and other preliminary matters would not themselves intrude on the foreign 
affairs power of the Executive.”318  
Justice Kennedy’s earlier opinions expressed an essential connection 
between constitutional structure and liberty. Boumediene, for example, stands 
on the ideal “[t]he laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in 
force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our 
system they are reconciled within the framework of the law.”319 His opinion in 
Trump—reflecting themes from his Beller opinion through more recent cases 
involving deference to the executive in foreign affairs—raises doubts about 
whether law alone is truly capable of reconciling liberty and security.320  
Kennedy’s last opinion on the Court reaffirmed his broader commitment to 
“substantial deference” to the executive in foreign affairs.321 But Trump went 
further, rejecting the ideal of judicial power to define and enforce liberty that 
had stood at the center of his jurisprudence. His opinion concedes that some 
executive decisions involving foreign policy are beyond the scope of courts and 
law, even when they implicate core claims of individual liberty.  
Kennedy’s “further observations” in Trump, expressing “urgent necessity” 
on behalf of “[a]n anxious world,” signal a final reckoning about the connection 
between constitutional structure and liberty.322 His closing appeal to executive 
conscience recalls his earlier statement that “the Framers of the Constitution 
could not command statesmanship. They could simply provide structures from 
which it might emerge.”323 In Clinton, failure of statesmanship did not justify an 
unconstitutional law; in Trump, anxiety about the true motives cannot invalidate 
a power over foreign policy granted by the Constitution to the Executive.  
“When structure fails,” Kennedy wrote as a younger Justice, “liberty is 
always in peril.”324 Yet constitutional structure cannot guarantee that those 
exercising powers do so wisely, or that the people it serves retain confidence in 
their commitment to the broader purposes constitutions are established to 
secure.325 As then-Judge Kennedy stated in 1982 before coming to the Court, 
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“the Constitution, in some of its most critical aspects, is what the political 
branches of government have made it, whether the judiciary approves or not.”326 
When officials empowered under the Constitution act in ways that depart from 
its meaning and promise, structure itself imperils any confidence “that freedom 
extends outward, and lasts.”327 Kennedy’s final opinion in Trump sounds a 
warning that extends beyond the instant case: The framework of law, enforced 
by courts, cannot suffice to reconcile liberty and security. 
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